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Abstract 
This article examines the extent of party autonomy in determining the norms that 
apply to the substance of a commercial dispute in arbitration. Particularly, it 
analyses ‘principles of law,’ the normative basis for arbitration under Ethiopian 
law. The article further explores whether parties to arbitration are at liberty to 
mandate the application of foreign law, rules of law and equity.  It also examines 
whether a ‘mandate to settle’ is enforceable under Ethiopian law. The article 
concludes that Ethiopian law allows maximum flexibility to parties as regards to 
the determination of norms applicable to the substance of a commercial dispute. 
The law can even be construed as recognising ‘mandate to settle’.  
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Different jurisdictions have slightly differing laws as regards the normative 
basis for decision on the substance of commercial disputes. In some 
jurisdictions, arbitrators are required to decide according to ‘law’, in some 
others according to ‘rules of law’1, and in yet others based on ‘principles of 
law’.  Even when identical terms are used, they are understood differently in 
various jurisdictions. Jurisdictions also differ in the latitude that they give to 
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1 UNCITRAL Model Law, on International Commercial Arbitration with amendments as 
adopted in 2006, General Assembly Resolution 61/33 adopted on 4 December 2006. For 
instance, Article 28(1) requires arbitrators to decide on substance of dispute based on ‘rules 
of law.’  
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parties toward enabling them to choose foreign laws and non-legal norms to 
resolve their differences.2 Moreover, the laws of some jurisdictions are silent 
about the foregoing issues thereby necessitating interpretation.  
Not all of these matters have been dealt with clearly under Ethiopian law. 
Hence, parties that intend to settle their disputes by arbitration inquire about the 
normative options open to them. Arbitrators dealing with specific disputes may 
also be confronted with the question of the norms they should apply to the 
substantive merits of the dispute before them. This question is discussed in 
following sections with due focus on commercial arbitration. In particular, the 
latitude that is provided –under Ethiopian law– to parties in choosing substantive 
norms applicable to their dispute is examined. 
The first section of this article deals with the arbitration agreement and its 
role in the determination of the norms applicable to the substance of the dispute. 
Section 2 dwells on ‘principles of law’, their meaning and role in the 
determination of merits of the dispute. Section 3 examines the latitude that 
parties have to choose foreign law and ‘rules of law.’ Equity, its different shades 
of meaning and its role in substantive resolution of disputes is discussed in 
section four.  The last section dwells on whether parties may vest in an arbitral 
tribunal power to modify the contract between them. Finally, some conclusions 
are drawn with regard to the extent of party autonomy in the determination of 
norms applicable to the substance of the dispute between them.  
1. The Arbitration Agreement: Meaning and Relevance 
An arbitration agreement is a contract by which two or more parties undertake 
to resolve their dispute, if any, by arbitration. It has a number of purposes. The 
first is ouster of a court which would otherwise have jurisdiction to resolve the 
dispute. The second is empowering an arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute, in 
lieu of the court.3 Third and the most pertinent for our purpose, the parties’ 
choice of law governing the substance of the contract is usually made in this 
contract itself.4 Owing to these reasons, among others, the agreement to arbitrate 
is an indispensable precondition for commercial arbitration.5  
                                           
2 Simon Greenberg et al (2011), International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-Pacific 
Perspective, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 101 to 102. 
3 Id., p. 144.  
4 Id., p. 101. In 2009, for example, 88% of parties to arbitration before the International 
Chamber of Commerce, ICC made their choice of the applicable law. 
5 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter (2004), Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 4th ed.), p. 131. As a matter of exception parties 
may be deemed to have agreed to arbitration without there being an arbitration agreement. 
This is, for instance, the case if estoppel or similar other doctrine in a jurisdiction precludes 
a party from objecting to arbitration because of its failure to raise the absence of arbitration 
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An agreement to arbitrate may be entered into as regards a future dispute or a 
dispute that has already occurred. When the agreement to arbitrate concerns a 
possible future dispute it is usually contained in the main contract between 
parties to a transaction. It is commonly known as arbitration clause. Such 
agreement is usually brief because parties do not know, at this point in time, that 
a dispute will arise.6 If the agreement is concluded after a dispute has arisen it is 
called a submission agreement. At this stage parties have made their mind as to 
how best to handle the problem. Hence, submission agreements tend to be more 
detailed.7 The majority of commercial arbitration results from arbitration 
clauses. Yet, they are often ‘midnight clauses’ drafted at the very end of 
negotiations with minimum thought and effort, partly because, at this point in 
time, parties are uncomfortable to contemplate falling into a dispute. As a result, 
wrong choices such as regarding the law applicable to the substance of the 
dispute tend to be made.8 
Ethiopian law deals with arbitration agreement in the Civil Code. 
Specifically, Articles 3325 to 3346 deal with arbitration agreement albeit under 
the title of ‘arbitral submission.’9 The Civil Procedure Code supplements these 
provisions.  Some of the latter’s provisions deal with the arbitration agreement 
itself.10 It is the Civil Code that defines arbitration and lays down the most 
important principles that are relevant to arbitration.  
The Civil Code defines ‘arbitral submission’ as ‘a contract whereby the 
parties to a dispute entrust its solution to a third party, the arbitrator, who 
                                                                                                            
agreement early in the arbitration process. In some jurisdictions there may even be a 
statutory provision to the same effect as estoppel. See also, Greenberg et al, supra note 2, 
at 145. The question is can such an award be enforced outside the jurisdiction in which it is 
made given the New York Convention Art II and IV(1)b require proof of a written 
agreement to arbitrate. The answer is no unless the country in which recognition and 
enforcement is sought has less stringent requirements than those in the Convention.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Id. pp. 131-132.  Submission agreements tend to deal with details of the arbitration such as 
place of arbitration, applicable substantive law, name of the arbitrators, specifics about 
matters in dispute, and may even deal with procedures that the arbitration is to follow such 
as exchange of written submissions, deadlines etc..., where such details are deemed 
desirable by the parties. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 165 of 1960, Negarit Gazeta, 
Gazette Extraordinary, 19th Year, No. 2. Title XX of this Code is entitled ‘Compromise and 
Arbitral Submissions. The Code dedicates Articles 3325 to 3346 to arbitration while the 
rest of the Title deals with compromise. 
10 The Civil Procedure Code Decree, Decree No.52 of 1965, Negarit Gazeta, Gazette 
Extraordinary, 25th Year, No. 3, Articles 315 to 318. 
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undertakes to settle the dispute in accordance with the principles of law’.11 
Despite the use of the term ‘arbitral submission’, the Civil Code indicates that 
both existing and future disputes may be referred to arbitrators for resolution.12 
In light of the usage in the Civil Code, we may conclude that the term ‘arbitral 
submission’ is equivalent to arbitration agreement under the Code. It is not 
limited to an agreement to arbitrate a dispute that has already arisen as is the 
case in the usage of many commentators. Therefore, on this point Ethiopian law 
has kept pace with global developments in arbitration law.13 The definition is 
also at par with or even relatively more specific than modern arbitration laws in 
the articulation of the elements of arbitration.14 
The next section briefly identifies the normative basis for arbitration that 
flows from the foregoing definition of arbitration in Ethiopia. We will then 
examine whether parties to a dispute have other options. We start with 
‘principles of law’ and their role in arbitration under Ethiopian law. 
 
                                           
11 Civil Code, supra note 9, Article 3325(1). Under Sub article (2) of the same Article the 
law indicates that an arbitrator may also be entrusted with establishing only a point of fact 
without deciding on the legal consequences flowing from those facts. 
12 Id., Article 3328. This article titled ‘object of contract and arbitration clause’ provides 
under sub article (1) an existing dispute could be referred to arbitration while sub article 2 
of the same provides parties ‘may also submit to arbitration disputes which may arise out 
of the contract in the future.’ That sub article 2 of this article dealing with disputes which 
may arise in the future singles out those that ‘arise out of a contract’ does not mean future 
disputes that do not arise from contract may not be resolved by arbitration. Sub article 3 
of the article clearly indicates that submission agreements regarding future disputes are 
valid so long as they arise from other ‘specific legal obligations.’ 
13 It is to be noted that, in earlier times many jurisdictions did not enforce arbitration clauses 
subjecting future disputes to arbitration. Agreement to arbitrate could only be concluded 
as regards disputes that had already arisen. This was the case, for example, under the 
Napoleonic Codes of France. See, Jean de la Hosseraye et al , Arbitration in France, CMS 
Guide to Arbitration, Vol.  I, p. 333. Available at:  
   <http://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration_volue_1/CMS%20GtA_Vol%20I_FRANCE.pdf>, 
accessed on 19 January 2017.  
14 Arbitration Act 1996 (of England), Section 6(1) defines ‘arbitration agreement’ as an 
agreement to submit to arbitration present or future (whether they are contractual or not). 
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, Article 7 defines arbitration agreement as ‘an 
agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen 
or may arise between them in respect of defined legal relationship, whether contractual or 
not.’  The Civil Procedure Code of Germany, ZPO, issued in 1998, Section 1029 defines 
arbitration agreement (Schiedsvereinbarung) in an essentially the same way as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. Available at: <www.disarb.org/en51/materials/german-
arbitration-law-98-id3>, accessed on 12 February 2016. 
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2. Substantive Resolution Based on ‘Principles of Law’  
In Ethiopia, the Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code espouse, on the face, 
different set of norms as the basis for the resolution of the merits of the dispute. 
According to Article 317(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, the arbitral tribunal is 
required to ‘… decide according to law unless by the submission it has been 
exempted from doing so.’ On the other hand, the Civil Code provides that 
arbitral submission is  ‘the contract whereby the parties to a dispute entrust its 
resolution to a third party, the arbitrator, who undertakes to settle the dispute in 
accordance with the principles of law.’15  (Emphasis added) 
A close look at these provisions and the two Codes leads us to resolve this 
conflict in favour of the Civil Code provision. To start with, it is the Civil Code 
that deals with arbitration and its nature in a meaningful detail.16 In contrast, the 
Civil Procedure Code merely dedicates few provisions to arbitration that are 
spread out and not coherently blended in harmony. Therefore, it is the Civil 
Code that may be deemed a special law as far as the nature of arbitration is 
concerned. Moreover, one notes that it is in the context of listing down what the 
tribunal should do that Article 317(2) of the Civil Procedure Code provides: 
‘[t]he tribunal shall, in particular, hear the parties and their evidence 
respectively and decide according to law … .’   
The ejusdem generis rule of interpretation requires that when one has an 
illustrative list of things that can be added, the items to be added to the list must 
share basic features with those on the list. If we go by that rule, ‘hearing the 
parties and their evidence’ are procedural matters rather than matters of 
substantive law. Moreover, Article 317 is titled ‘procedure before arbitration 
tribunal.’ So, its application is limited to the procedural conduct of arbitration 
rather than the norms applicable to the substance of the dispute. In any case, the 
Civil Code is a proclamation while the Civil Procedure Code is only a decree. 
Owing to its higher status in the hierarchy of laws, the Civil Code supersedes 
the Civil Procedure Code in the event of conflict between their provisions.  The 
Civil Procedure Code, itself substantiates this point because Article 315(4) 
provides that, in case of conflict Articles 3325 to 3346 of the Civil Code prevail 
over the provisions of the chapter in which Article 315(4) of the Civil Procedure 
Code is found.  In sum, the Civil Code prevails, and arbitrators are not required 
to merely decide ‘according to law’. They may decide ‘in accordance with 
principles of law.’17 (Emphasis added). 
 
                                           
15 Civil Code of Ethiopia, supra note 9, Article 3325(1). 
16 Id., Articles 3325 to 3346. 
17 Id., Art 3325(1). 
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2.1 Decision Based on Principles of Law and According to Law: Any 
Difference between the Two? 
Settlement of a dispute based on ‘principles of law’ is not identical with 
settlement in accordance with the ‘law’. Principles of law consist of objective 
and abstract notions often developed over the centuries.18 They may be derived 
from domestic, foreign or common rules of legal thinking. Some of them find 
their way into the national laws of countries.19 Where they are, thus, 
incorporated into a specific national legal system, they form part of the ‘legal 
norms’ in force in the jurisdiction concerned.  
Some other principles, however, remain unincorporated into a national legal 
system. In such cases, the principles of law are not really ‘legal norms’ as 
regards that particular jurisdiction. They are merely directives of behaviour 
rather than legal norms as such.20 In the context of commercial arbitration, it is 
said that notions like ‘pacta sunt servanda, . . . force majeure, the principle that 
execution of a contract implies its existence, the principle of interpretation 
contra proferentem, the obligation to mitigate damage, and good faith’ are 
accepted as general principles of law, if they are not already incorporated in the 
domestic law of a jurisdiction.21 Ethiopian law allows arbitrators to decide based 
on principles of law without the need for specific authorisation by the parties to 
that effect, and this makes it very liberal compared to jurisdictions that require 
arbitrators to decide based on law only. 
2.2 Principles of Law and Lex Mercatoria: Are the Two Coextensive?  
The substantive content of lex mercatoria and its relationship with national laws 
are vigorously contested matters.22 It may be argued that the confusion is partly 
attributable to the fact that the concept evolved to acquire different meanings in 
                                           
18  Łukasz Błaszczak and Joanna Kolber (2013), ‘General Principles of Law and Equity as a 
Basis for Decision Making in Arbitration’, Comparative Law Review, pp.189-190. 
19 Id., pp. 191 and 198. Polish doctrine, for example, considers: ‘freedom of contract in 
international trade, principle of rebus sic stantibus, pacta sunct servanda, the principle of 
good faith, prohibition of abuse of subjective rights, the principle of cooperation between 
the creditor and debtor to perform the contract, the principle of liability for breach of 
contract and damages, prohibition of contradicting the effects of own behaviour or prior 
acts of will (venire contra factum proprium nemini licet), the principle that the impossible 
excludes obligation (imposibilium nulla obliagatio), the principle of protection of 
acquired rights, the principle of protection of trust as transnational general principles of 
law.  
20 Id., p. 194.  
21 Id., p. 192.  
22 Ana Mercedes Lopez Rodriguez, ‘Lex Mercatoria’, available at: 
<law.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_jura/documenter/forskning/rettid/artikler/20020046.p
df>, accessed on 20 July 2016. 
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different times.23 In any event, the various conceptions of this nebulous concept 
may be grouped into three headings. According to the first view, lex mercatoria 
is simply a legal order that is created spontaneously by parties engaged in 
international economic interaction. It exists independent of national legal orders. 
The second conception is that it is a set of rules, sufficient to resolve a dispute 
that can be used as an alternative to an otherwise applicable national system of 
laws, which could be rooted in laws of various nations and trade practice. Lex 
mercatoria is, according to the third conception, a ‘gradual consolidation of 
usages and settled expectations’ in international commerce which may 
supplement the applicable law.24  
The first conception, lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal order, is not 
tenable. To start with, one cannot demonstrate where such an autonomous legal 
order derives its normative power from. Secondly, at present, at least, it is not 
comprehensive enough to deal with all aspects of a commercial dispute.25 The 
second understanding of lex mercatoria too is not convincing as a matter of 
current reality. Simply, there are no universal rules of commerce whether 
grounded on national laws or practice that can sufficiently deal with the 
intricacies of commercial transactions.26 It thus appears that only the third 
conception of lex mercatoria (i.e., international trade usages sufficiently 
established to warrant that parties to international contracts are deemed to be 
bound by) stands the test of a rigorous analysis. 
It is to be noted that lex mercatoria, and ‘principles of law’ are not 
coextensive although some authors conflate the two concepts.27 Particularly, the 
sources of lex mercatoria are more diverse compared to principles of law. Its 
                                           
23 Ralf Michaels (2007), ‘The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State’, Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 478. It is possible to divide the evolution of 
this concept into three stages: ancient lex mercatoria of the middle ages meaning a 
‘transnational set of norms and procedural principles that established by and for 
commerce in (relative) autonomy from states.’ The second stage refers to what one may 
call ‘new lex mercatoria’ as was understood in the 20th Century to mean ‘an informal and 
flexible net of rules and arbitrators establishing a private international commercial law.’ 
The third stage which we may call ‘new new lex mercatoria  which moves from an 
amorphous and flexible soft law to an established system of law with codified legal rules’ 
principally the UNIDROIT Principles of International and Commercial Law and strongly 
institutionalized court-like international arbitration. 
24 William W. Park (2012), Arbitration of International Business Disputes, 2nd Ed., Oxford 
University Press, pp. 591 and 596. 
25 Id. p. 595.  
26 Id. pp. 596-597. Though one may argue, for instance, the Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts published by UNIDROIT in 1994 represent lex mercatoria this is 
not tenable. This can at best be a snapshot of lex mercatoria as of 1994, not lex mercatoria 
itself. In fact, this document can turn out to be a competitor to lex mercatoria gradually. 
27  Blaszczak and Kolber, supra note 18,  p. 191. 
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sources include ‘… principles of law common to most national legal systems (or 
at least those relevant to the contract in question), norms set down in widely 
accepted international treaties, trade usages of the relevant transnational 
sectors, and indeed international arbitral awards’28 (emphasis added). As can be 
gathered from this, trade usages and customs are part of lex mercatoria but do 
not constitute principles of law, hence, making lex mercatoria wider in its 
coverage. 
When the Civil Code of Ethiopia authorizes arbitrators to settle disputes 
based on ‘principles of law’, it thus allows them to go beyond legal norms 
embodied in the national laws of a specific country. It authorises them to make 
use of legal principles that the arbitrators deem appropriate under the specific 
circumstances. However, it does not authorise arbitrators to apply lex 
mercatoria in its entirety as this notion includes trade usages and customs that 
do not necessarily qualify as principles of law. In sum, the application of lex 
mercatoria, in its entirety, does not flow from Article 3325(1) of the Civil Code 
that recognises principles of law as substantive parameters applicable to the 
merits of a dispute before arbitrators.  
3. Foreign Law and ‘Rules of Law’: Are They on the Menu?  
Historically, the conflict of laws rules of the seat of arbitration played a 
predominant role in determining the law applicable to the merits of the dispute. 
The wish of the parties to arbitration, in this regard, was only a secondary 
consideration. This position was embodied even in the resolution of the Institute 
of International Law. Article 11 of the 1957 Resolution on the ‘Law Applicable 
to the Substance of the Difference’ provides that ‘[t]he rules of choice of law in 
force in the state of the seat of arbitral tribunal must be followed to settle the law 
applicable to the substance of the difference. Within the limits of such law, 
arbitrators shall apply the law chosen by the parties . . . .’29 (Emphasis added). 
This mandatory recourse to the conflict of laws rules of the seat of arbitration 
in determining the substantive law applicable to the merits of the dispute was 
severely criticised in the years following the adoption of the above Resolution. 
Many scholars such as Lazare Kopelmanas in 1964, Philippe Fouchard in 1965 
and Pierre Lalive in 1967 contended that this position is arbitrary.30 According 
to Lalive, for instance, a country which is a seat to an international arbitral 
                                           
28 W. Michael Reisman et al (1997), International Commercial Arbitration: Cases, 
Materials and Notes on the Resolution of International Business Disputes, New York: 
The Foundation Press, Inc., p. 202. 
29  Emmanuel Gaillard (2010), Legal Theory of International Arbitration, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, p. 107.   
30 Id. p. 109. 
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tribunal has little, if any, interest in having its choice of law rules determine 
what rules should apply to the merits of the dispute, because the dispute, in most 
cases, is totally unconnected to it. He takes the case of Switzerland where 
numerous international arbitrations take place although the disputes have 
nothing to do with Switzerland other than the parties choosing it as a preferred 
venue. Hence, he wondered what interest Switzerland could have to insist that 
its choice of law rules should prevail over the choice of parties regarding the 
applicable substantive law.31 
Three decades after the adoption of the 1957 Resolution, opinion regarding 
the role of parties shifted significantly, and even the Institute of International 
Law had to formally reverse its position. Article 6 of its 1989 Resolution reads:  
The parties have full autonomy to determine the … substantive rules and 
principles that are to apply to the arbitration. In particular, … these rules and 
principles may be derived from different national legal systems as well as 
from non-national sources such as principles of international law, general 
principles of law, and the usages of international commerce. To the extent 
the parties have left such issues open, the tribunal shall supply the necessary 
rules and principles drawing on the sources indicated in Article 4 … .32 
Article 4, to which the foregoing provision of the 1989 Resolution makes 
reference, indicates as possible sources: the law chosen by the parties to a 
dispute, the law that is indicated by applying the choice of law rules chosen by 
the parties, general principles of private and public international law, general 
principles of international arbitration or the law that the courts of the seat of 
arbitration would apply.33 We need to underscore, in this connection, that 
Ethiopia has no conflict of laws rules that could tie the hands of the parties and 
arbitrators as regards the law that must be applied to the substance of the 
dispute.34 
Today, most countries have arbitration laws that require arbitrators to respect 
the choice made by the parties regarding the law applicable to the merits of the 
dispute. The UNCITRAL Model Law, which has been adopted in many 
jurisdictions, for example, provides that, ‘[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the 
dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as 
applicable to the substance of the dispute’.35 The Model Law further clarifies 
this by pointing out that any reference made to the law or legal system of a 
                                           
31 Ibid.  
32 Id. p. 110. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Samuel Teshale (2000), ‘Toward Generalizing Judicial Jurisdiction in Ethiopia.’ TFLR- 
Private International Law, Vol. 8 p. 195.   
35 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, Article 28(1). 
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country is to be construed as directly referring to the substantive law of the 
jurisdiction concerned to the exclusion of the conflict of laws rules of such state, 
unless otherwise provided expressly.36  
According to the travaux préparatoires of the Model Law, the phrase ‘rules 
of law’ is broader than the law of a given national jurisdiction. The use of this 
term in Article 28(1) is aimed at expanding the range of options open to parties. 
Thus, for example, parties to an arbitration agreement could choose instruments 
such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (Vienna, 1980) as the rules of law applicable to the merits of the 
dispute.37 There are only few countries that still do not clearly provide parties 
(to an arbitration agreement) the freedom to determine the laws or rules 
applicable to the merits of the dispute. Such countries tend to be on the fringes 
of global commerce.38  
Ethiopia’s law does not expressly deal with whether parties are at liberty to 
determine the norms to be applied to the merits of the dispute. One can make 
arguments in support of the view that the law leaves this matter to the parties to 
the arbitration agreement. According to the definition of arbitration agreements 
under the Civil Code, the arbitrator ‘… undertakes to settle the dispute in 
accordance with the principles of law,’39 and not the law only. As discussed 
under Section 2 above, ‘principles of law’ are broader than laws adopted by a 
specific jurisdiction. Moreover, unlike in some other jurisdictions, we note that 
under Ethiopian law, the arbitrators need not have specific authorisation to 
decide on the basis of principles of law. If arbitral tribunals can go beyond 
applying the law, and apply principles of law, we may (for a stronger reason) 
hold that parties are at liberty to determine the ‘laws’ or ‘rules of law’ to be 
applied to the merits of the dispute. The fact that arbitrators need not be lawyers 
indirectly supports this point.40  
                                           
36 Ibid.        
37 Id. at p. 33. 
38 For example, in Uzbekistan the national law applies and in Georgia the law is silent on 
this issue. In Belarus and Moldova, the parties to a dispute are free to choose among the 
laws of other countries or jurisdictions but not ‘rules of law’ such as international customs 
as codified by some organisations etc.... European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (2007), International Commercial Arbitration Assessment: Report on the 
Results of the Assessment in the CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and 
Mongolia), Roman Chapaev consultant to the project, p. 10. Available at: 
<www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/judicial/arbitration.pdf>, accessed on 03/11/2013. 
39  Civil Code of Ethiopia, supra note 9, Article 3325(1). 
40 Id., Article 3339(1). According to this provision, ‘[a]ny person may be appointed as an 
arbitrator.’ 
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As René David, the drafter of the Civil Code of Ethiopia notes, the Code 
accepts the general principle of contractual freedom.41 The parties to a contract 
are, therefore, at liberty to define the object of the contract. David underscores 
that the law sanctions and ‘gives effect to the will of the parties as manifested by 
their contract’ as long as they do not violate any legal prohibition.42 The law 
should be understood as presuming freedom rather than prohibition. The 
contrary view that only matters expressly allowed by the law are lawful would 
compel society to move at the pace of the lawmaker and hence would seriously 
arrest progress. It is this point that René David makes when he states that 
contractual freedom is ‘fundamental to a society and an economy that wants to 
leave considerable scope to private initiative.’43 Article 16 of the Civil Code 
which vests in every person ‘freedom of action’ is in tandem with such 
freedom.44 The fact that the law is silent on this matter other than allowing 
arbitrators to decide based on ‘principles of law’ implies the freedom of parties 
to choose the applicable norms. In other words, laws of any jurisdiction and 
arguably ‘rules of law’ embodied in instruments that have not necessarily been 
adopted in the national laws of any country can be chosen by the parties.  
Even though such interpretation is plausible, any future revision of Ethiopian 
law should clearly indicate party autonomy in this regard. That will help obviate 
unnecessary confusion and limit the room for unwarranted litigation on this 
subject. Furthermore, any future legal revision should indicate that the 
designation of the law of a specific jurisdiction as applicable refers to the 
substantive law of that chosen jurisdiction to the exclusion of the conflict of 
laws rules of that jurisdiction. This way, the law can preclude the risk of the 
substance of the dispute being governed by the laws of a third country that the 
parties did not envisage. The application of conflict of laws rules of the 
designated country could have potentially that effect. In order to avoid this 
scenario, the Model Law provides, ‘[a]ny designation of the law or legal system 
of a given state shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly 
referring to the substantive law of that State and not to its conflict of laws 
rules.’45 
                                           
41 René David (1973), Commentary on Contracts in Ethiopia, Translated into English by 
Michael Kindred ( Haile Sellassie I University) p. 29. 
42 Ibid.             
43 Ibid.               
44 Civil Code of Ethiopia, supra note 9. According to Article 16(1) ‘[e]very person is free to 
exercise any activity which he deems proper . . . .’ Per sub article 2 of the same article 
‘[t]he only restrictions which such freedom admits of are those which are imposed by the 
respect for the rights of others, morality and the law.’ 
45 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, Article 28(1). 
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4. Equity: Its Shades of Meaning and Role 
Arbitration laws of various jurisdictions differ in the extent to which they allow 
parties to authorize the arbitration tribunal to derogate from the strict application 
of laws and rules of law and decide based on equity.  They also seem to attribute 
different meanings to the word equity.46  In fact, the term is understood in many 
different ways even within the context of a specific legal tradition let alone in 
different jurisdictions and legal traditions.47  Perhaps, the best way to understand 
the various shades of meaning of this term is to analyse it in terms of ‘weaker’ 
and ‘stronger’ understanding of equity following the classification by German 
legal theoreticians such as Karl Engish and Jeseph Esser.48  
4.1 ‘Weaker’ (or narrow) interpretation of ‘equity’ 
According to the ‘weaker’ understanding of the term, decision based on equity 
is a ‘decision taken in light of the law and in accordance with the legal 
directions which emanate from the strict legal rules in force’.49 In this 
understanding, the law may direct a judge to employ equity to solve a problem 
in cases of vagueness of the law or when it is silent regarding some aspects of 
the case at hand. So, equity plays a role in decision making within the bounds of 
the legal system. It is an intra-systematic way of decision making.50 According 
to the proponents of this ‘weaker’ understanding, decision making in equity 
cannot be at variance with the law. Decisions should always start from the law 
in force because the law ‘... expresses, in its highest degree of development, 
what in a given society is considered as just, ethical, adequate and convenient.’51  
Analysis of Ethiopian law, particularly the Civil Code, reveals that equity in 
this ‘weaker’ sense is fully embraced in Ethiopian laws. For instance, the court 
may determine the remuneration due to a commission agent on the basis of 
equity where the remuneration has not been agreed upon and there is no custom 
regarding this matter at the place where the contract was concluded.52 A court 
may determine wages due to an employee based on equity where this is neither 
settled by a contract nor by custom of the place where work is performed.53  
Remuneration due to an author is to be fixed by a court based on equity in the 
                                           
46 Błaszczak and Kolber, supra note 18, p. 198. 
47 Ibid.      . 
48 António Sampaio Caramelo (2008), ‘Arbitration in Equity and Amiable Composition 
under Portuguese Law’, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 25, p. 571. 
49 Id., p. 572.                  
50 Ibid.                                 
51 Ibid.                                 
52  Civil Code of Ethiopia, supra note 9, Article 2243. 
53 Id., Article 2535.                  
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absence of agreement regarding the matter between him and the publisher.54 In 
some other cases, the Civil Code empowers the court to award compensation 
where equity so requires. For instance, the court is empowered to award 
compensation on the basis of equity to the owner of land upstream where the 
exploitation of his land is impaired by prohibition from using water bordering or 
crossing his land.55 Likewise, the law authorises a court to award compensation, 
where equity so requires, to a person whose image has been sold or otherwise 
used for the enrichment of some other person.56 
We also note that a number of provisions of the Civil Code direct the court to 
determine or reduce the quantum of compensation due in cases of tortuous acts 
and omissions having regard to equity. For instance, a court may reduce 
compensation due where the damage caused by a person ‘expands beyond what 
could reasonably be expected, in consequence of unforeseeable circumstances’57 
or in cases where the person who committed the wrongful act was not in a state 
to appreciate the wrongful nature of his conduct.58 Although it is rare, the Civil 
Code may authorise total or partial invalidation of a juridical act on grounds of 
equity. A case in point is Article 368(3) of the Civil Code that authorises a court 
to invalidate, in part or in whole, a will made by an interdicted person prior to 
his interdiction where provisions contained in such will are deemed to be 
contrary to equity. 
Although the Civil Code of Ethiopia directs courts to utilize parameters of 
equity, the use of equity envisaged by the Civil Code seems to have aimed at 
reinforcing the rules or principles enunciated by the Code so that the courts can 
resort to equity in certain legally determined situations. The Code does not seem 
to mandate courts to ignore or disregard the rules embodied in the Code, in a bid 
to render a decision based on what a judge considers equitable irrespective of 
the law.  Hence, it is safe to conclude that the foregoing are instances of 
interpreting the notion of equity in the ‘weaker’ sense. Since, courts are 
empowered to use parameters of equity in these legally predetermined 
situations, arbitrators too are empowered to do that as party appointed judges. 
 
 
                                           
54 Id., Article 2692.  The law authorises the court to grant compensation to a farmer tenant in 
regard of expenses he incurred for cultivation of fruits that are still un-detached at the 
time of the termination of the contract according to Article 3015(1) and (2) of the Civil 
Code. 
55 Id., Articles 1239 and 1240(1).        
56 Id., Article 29(2).                              
57 Id., Article 2101.                               
58 Id., Article 2099. See also Articles 2100, 2142 and 2160(1) for more on the Courts use of 
equity.  
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4.2 ‘Stronger’ (or wider) interpretation of ‘equity’ 
Equity is used in its ‘stronger’ sense when it is applied in order to resolve a 
disparity that arises when ‘the morally accurate, abstract and general norm is in 
conflict with the moral evaluation of the specific circumstances subject to 
decision making’.59 Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics, stated that all laws are 
‘universal’ in that they do not deal with a specific case.  Because the lawmaker 
is compelled to speak universally, and it is not possible to do so correctly about 
each and every case, the law takes the usual case and addresses that though it is 
aware of the possibility of errors entailed in this approach: 60  
[w]hen the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not 
covered by the universal statement, then it is right, when the legislator fails us 
and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission - to say what the 
legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put 
into his law if he had known . . . . And this is the nature of the equitable, a 
correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.61     
Understood in this wider sense, decisions based on equity are not solely based 
on the regulatory logic of the legal system and its rules. The decision-maker, in 
this understanding of equity, is entitled to depart from the rigid legal solutions, 
which by definition provide rigid decision criteria, and base his/her decision on 
the so-called justice of the concrete case.62 We note, at this juncture, that an 
arbitrator vested with the power to decide on the basis of equity, understood in 
this stronger sense, wields wider powers than an arbitrator that is empowered to 
decide based on ‘principles of law’ discussed under section 2 above.63  
However, it is to be noted that such ‘strong’/wide interpretation of equity 
does not empower the decision-maker to disregard the paramount values of the 
legal order or to violate public policy. It only gives the decision-maker a certain 
leeway that transcends legal norms. Particularly, in relation to arbitral tribunals, 
we note that their powers and competence always lie within the boundaries of 
the parties’ own competence. Since the parties to arbitration themselves have no 
power or right to violate public policy, a fortiori, arbitrators too may not do 
this.64 If arbitrators violate public policy even where they are authorised by 
parties to decide based on equity, understood in the ‘stronger’ sense, the arbitral 
award could be annulled or refused enforcement on the ground of violation of 
                                           
59 Blaszczac and Kolber, supra note 18, at 199.                  
60 Quoted in Mauro Rubino-Sammartano (1992), ‘Amiable Compositéur (Joint Mandate to 
Settle) and Ex Bono Et Aequo (Discretional Authority to Mitigate Strict Law- Apparent 
Synonyms Revisited’, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 7. 
61  Ibid.                                   
62 Caramelo supra note 48, p. 573.         
63 Blaszczak and Kolber supra note 18, p. 190. 
64 Id., p. 204.                        
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public policy. For instance, decision–making on the basis of equity may not 
justify the violation of the rights of defence. The precise contours and 
boundaries of this right, however, differ in various legal systems. Thus, all 
circumstances must be evaluated a casu ad casum in order to determine whether 
or not public policy has been violated in this regard.65 
4.3 Synthesis of the narrow and wide interpretations in Ethiopian law 
We do not come across instances in which the court, under Ethiopian law, could 
make use of ‘equity’ in the stronger sense and disregard the law. However, that 
does not mean that an arbitrator will be similarly confined to the narrower or 
‘weaker’ understanding of equity, despite powers conferred on him/her by 
parties to make use of equity in the stronger sense of the term. Although not in 
relation to Ethiopian Law, Professor René David, the drafter of the Ethiopian 
Civil Code contends that an arbitrator has wider powers than a judge in this 
regard. He maintains, in voluntary arbitration, the arbitrator has the powers 
vested in him by the parties. Hence, the first ‘law’ he must follow is the private 
agreement from which arise his powers.  
The state law does not mean exactly the same thing to a judge sitting in a 
state court and an arbitrator. For the judge, there is no law beyond what the state 
prescribes. His powers and duties emanate only from the law. This is not the 
case with the arbitrator who neither derives his powers from the state nor 
decides in its name. The arbitrator must take into account what the parties that 
empowered him/her (to decide in equity) expect of him/her and thus decide 
based on ‘equity’ understood in a stronger sense.66 Though Ethiopian law 
requires the arbitrator to settle dispute based on ‘principles of law’, it does not 
prohibit parties from authorising the arbitrator to decide based on equity. In the 
absence of a prohibition against that, interpreting the law in line with what 
Professor René David says is reasonable. 
Therefore, we may conclude that arbitrators in Ethiopia can go beyond 
‘principles of law’, and decide cases on the basis of equity understood in both 
the ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ sense of the term. Equity in the ‘weaker’ sense is 
embraced by the law itself expressly since the law authorises courts to make use 
of equity in a number of situations. As regards, equity understood in the 
‘stronger’ sense there is nothing in the law that prohibits parties from 
authorising its use by arbitrators. The authority of an arbitral tribunal is derived 
from the agreement to arbitrate, and not the law as such, and the tribunal does 
not decide in the name of the state. This implies that parties in dispute can 
validly authorise the use of equity in the stronger sense of the term in Ethiopia.  
This is, of course, subject to compliance with public policy of the state. Hence, 
                                           
65 Ibid.                                
66 Caramelo supra note 48, p. 574.                        
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we hold that Ethiopian law is abreast of jurisdictions in the vanguard of 
adopting the stronger version.67  
5. Beyond Equity: ‘Mandate to Settle’ and Modify Contract 
At least in theory, it is possible for arbitrators to base their decisions (on 
substantive issues) on parameters outside rules of law, principles of law and 
even equity. They may, in some jurisdictions be given a free hand to the extent 
of modifying the contract between the parties to reach a settlement, if so 
authorised by the parties. In section 5.1 below, we will explore the trend in this 
regard in other jurisdictions. We will then examine the state of the law and 
practice in Ethiopia in section 5.2. 
5.1 Overview of the Trend in Other Jurisdictions 
Parties to an arbitration agreement sometimes authorise arbitrators to decide as 
amiable compositéurs. However, there is no consensus as to what this term 
means.  Particularly, whether it means the same thing as ex aequo et bono or 
something different is contestable. We gather, on the one hand, that the two 
terms are understood differently at least in some jurisdictions, though that is 
very seldom sufficiently dealt with in case law and legislations. On the other 
hand, it seems that many authors and lawyers treat the two terms as identical in 
effect, and use them interchangeably.  
Historically they seem to be different. The earliest use of the term seems to 
be in the context of public law. For example, we find it used as early as in 1272, 
when Bishop Barthélémy and the elders of Cahors appointed arbitres et 
amiables compositéurs to settle their disputes regarding local customs. 
Similarly, in 1334, we come across the appointment of Philippe de Valois as 
‘judge, arbitrator, and amiable compositéur’ to resolve a dispute between the 
Duke of Brabant and various German princes. In this context, it appears that the 
task of  amiable compositéurs was finding a landing place that both sides to the 
dispute would accept as fair rather than decision resulting from strict tenets of 
                                           
67 Arbitration laws and case law show a number of countries (considered as important 
centres of international arbitration) allowing arbitrators to decide on the basis of equity. 
For example, Article 1051(3) of the German ZPO and Article 822 of the Italian Code of 
Civil Procedure allow parties to authorise arbitrators to decide based on the principles of 
equity. Similarly, in Switzerland and Poland parties are entitled to authorise the arbitral 
tribunal to decide on the basis of equity. Interestingly, perhaps in keeping with the 
English tradition that is less disposed to accept decision based on equity, the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996 only implicitly allows arbitrators to decide based on equity. 
Article 46(1)b of the Act provides that the tribunal may decide: ‘if the parties so agree, in 
accordance with such other considerations as are agreed by them or determined by the 
tribunal.’   See Blaszczak and Kolber supra note 18, at 199 and 201.                
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international law, if international law did exist in that distant era.68 This notion 
then found its way into commercial law. By early 19th century it was well 
established in French law that arbitrators mandated to proceed comme amiable 
compositéur could ‘dispense with observing strict rules of law so that they rule 
solely by following their conscience and the impulse of natural equity’.69   
The question of relevance for us, now, is whether a tribunal with such powers 
may modify or ‘rewrite’ the contractual terms between the parties to a dispute. It 
can, if we go by the literal meaning of the term amiable compositéur. This is the 
case because the term means one who effects a settlement.70 According to 
Caramelo, the Portuguese law of arbitration takes this view. It vests in the 
composição amigável, the power to decide ‘the dispute by appealing to the 
composition of the parties, on the basis of the balance of interests at stake.’71 
Caramelo argues that since the Act also allows parties to arbitration agreement 
to empower the arbitrator to decide according to equity, the language of Article 
35 must mean something more. He contends we should presume that the 
legislator uses different words to mean different things. So, settlement of a 
dispute on the basis of equity in the stronger sense of the term is only part of the 
powers of the amiable compositeur; and an arbitrator can go beyond that.72  
This should not, however, be understood as giving complete discretion to the 
extent of empowering the arbitrator to take a sentimental or psychological 
approach to justice. That would lead to arbitrary decisions. The amiable 
compositeur should, therefore, adhere to certain principles that are widely 
shared by the members of the relevant business community. These principles are 
the following:73  
a) a presumption that the parties intended to establish an economic equality 
or balance regarding their contributions agreed in the contract entered 
into (a balance, if it has been broken, the amiable compositeur, deciding 
in equity, should try to restore); 
                                           
68  Edward P. Krugman et al (2010), ‘Honourable Engagement’, Bloomberg Law Reports, 
Insurance Law, Vol. 4 No. 8 , p.3  available at 
<https://www.cahill.com/publications/published-
articles/000092/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Honorable_Engagment.pdf>, accessed on 
20 July 2015.  
69 Ibid.                     
70 Id., p. 4.             
71 Caramelo, supra note 48, p. 576. He cites Article 35 of the Portuguese Arbitration Act as 
conferring such extensive powers in this kind of arbitrator.                
72 Ibid. According to Mr. Caramelo the wording of Article 35 leads one to conclude that the 
‘composição amigável de litígio contemplated therein is not a decision in equity minus, 
but rather a decision in equity plus.   
73 Id., p. 577.                                    
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b) a presumption of intended equality of risk, as initially set out in the 
contract concluded by the parties (which, if it has been later significantly 
disturbed, the amiable compositeur, deciding in equity, should attempt to 
rebuild to the extent that is possible, fair and reasonable); and  
c) applying the requirement of good faith in the execution of contracts 
(employing equity should allow the amiable compositeur to sanction 
certain behaviours of a party to a contract in bad faith which are not 
reproachable under the strict rules of law, as well as to temper the 
responsibility of a defaulting party who acted in good faith). 
Caramelo maintains that the dissertation of Professor Eric Loquin embodies the 
above understanding of amiable composition and it is likely to have been known 
to the members of the Portuguese Parliament that introduced the wording seen 
above to Article 35 in the final text of the Arbitration Act.74 Hence, he contends 
that an amiable compositeur has quasi settlement making power in the Act. He 
has the power to search for a settlement that has the best prospect of being 
accepted by both sides. He appeases the parties. For this purpose he can 
‘rewrite’ the contract to re-establish the initially agreed equilibrium of the 
contractual quid pro quo.  
This does not, however, go to the extent of rewriting the contract to correct 
the disequilibrium created by the parties intentionally at the very outset when 
they signed the contract.75 In sum, when parties authorise the arbitrator to act as 
a compositor amigável in accordance with Article 35 of the Portuguese 
Arbitration act, the arbitrator is empowered to go beyond equity understood in 
the ‘stronger’ sense of the term discussed in the foregoing section. He should 
discharge the ‘appeasement function’ described above on top of equity.76  
In a 2008 Canadian case77 an arbitral tribunal took essentially the same view 
as that seen above although the trial court and the Court of Appeal in Québec 
vacated the award on a ‘different’ ground. The dispute involved a family 
business. One faction of the family bought the other out of the family’s 
business. The payout agreed upon was based on a formula that linked the 
amount to be paid to the profitability of the business at the time of the 
agreement. The buyout contract contained an arbitration clause authorizing the 
arbitrator to act as amiable compositeur.78 The business turned out to be 
                                           
74 Id., p. 578.                                    
75 Id., pp. 577 to 578.                           
76 Id., p. 578. See also, Blaszczak and Kolber supra note 18, p.203 According to some 
authors in Polish doctrine too an amiable compositeur may disregard the rights and 
obligations ‘formulated imperatively’ in the contract between the parties.  
77 Coderre v. Coderre, Montreal Court of Appeal, as quoted in Krugman et al, supra note 
68, p. 4.  
78 Ibid.                                           
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extremely profitable. Yet, the family that sold its entitlement to part of the 
business received no payout, on the main, owing to the fact that the formula did 
not sufficiently integrate future acquisitions into the calculation of ‘available 
funds.’ Hence, when the dispute was eventually brought before the amiable 
compositeur, he struck two provisions from the formula in the contract. His 
determination was that the definition in the formula led to a result neither of the 
parties had anticipated. Hence, he reasoned that ‘the formula may be amended to 
ensure that the intention of the parties is fulfilled,’ and that the powers vested in 
the amiable compositeur empower him to do so.79 He reasoned he was not 
ignoring the contract. Rather, he was making changes in the contract in order to 
fulfil the intention of the parties to the contract and concretise the same.80   
The trial court of Québec, however, vacated the award, and its decision was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeal contains 
a scholarly exegesis of the powers of the amiable compositeur. It concludes that 
the award would have been above reproach under the law in force in the past. Its 
confirmation of the trial court’s decision vacating the award was based on 
Article 944.10 of the Québec Code of Civil Procedure. The said provision which 
follows the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law approach gives effect to 
amiable compositeur designations. However, like the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
it expressly states that the arbitrators ‘shall in all cases decide according to the 
stipulations of the contract.’81 (Emphasis added). In other words, even when 
authorised to act as amiable compositeurs, the arbitrators under the Model Law 
cannot depart from the terms of the contract. 
Overall, it appears that the international arbitration discourse has not yet 
reached a consensus on the role of amiable compositeur. According to some, 
arbitrators cannot disregard the contractual terms even when authorised to act as 
amiable compositeurs while others maintain that such arbitrators are allowed to 
revise the contract, where necessary. The former view is popular in Swiss 
doctrine. According to this view, allowing arbitrators to revise a contract is 
irreconcilable with the fundamental principle of pacta suncta servanda. There 
are instances indicating that arbitral case law is in line with this viewpoint.  
Błaszczak and Kolber offer –as examples– ICC case No. 3267 of 1979 and ICC 
Case No. 3938 of 1982.82 In the latter, for instance, the arbitral tribunal 
reasoned83: 
[a]ccording to the dominant doctrine and practice of international commercial 
arbitration, an arbitrator amiable compositeur remains bound by the contract 
                                           
79 Ibid.                                          
80 Ibid.                                           
81 Ibid.                                                  
82 Blaszczak and Kolber, supra note 18, pp. 207-208. 
83 Id., p. 208. 
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[…]. Considerations that may lead the amiable compositeur to mitigate the 
effects of the application of dispositive provisions of law in specific 
circumstances are inapplicable in respect of the contract, a special regulation 
arising out of the parties’ own will. 
In sum, it must be said that, at least, in arbitration laws drafted following the 
Model Law approach on this point, arbitrators are not empowered to change 
terms of the contract even when entrusted to act as amiable compositeurs by the 
parties. Article 28(3) of the Model Law allows parties to authorise arbitrators to 
act as amiable compositeurs; but Article 28(4) makes it clear that ‘in all cases’ 
the arbitral tribunal is to ‘decide in accordance with the terms of the contract’ 
taking into consideration the usages of trade relevant to the transaction in 
question.84 (Emphasis added) 
5.2 ‘Mandate to Settle’ under Ethiopian Law  
Ethiopian law does not make any reference to amiable composition. In fact, all it 
says regarding substantive basis of arbitral decisions is that arbitrators 
‘undertake to settle the dispute in accordance with the principles of law.’ As 
already discussed, this empowers arbitrators to decide based on ‘law’, ‘rules of 
law’ and even more. The question is whether this implies powers to the extent of 
revising (or to some extent disregarding) the terms of the contract between the 
parties. For example, Article 1763 does not allow courts to modify a contract on 
grounds of equity unless that is expressly provided by law.85 As already 
discussed, arbitrators as party appointed judges, decide neither in the name nor 
on behalf of the state. Hence, it may be contended that they have broader powers 
than a court in this regard where they are authorised to decide based on equity. 
More specifically, it may be held that where parties authorise arbitrators to act 
                                           
84 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, Article 28(4). According to the Travaux 
Préparatoires empowering arbitrators to act as amiable compositeurs and for that matter 
to decide based on equity is not used in all legal systems. So, the model law did not want 
to regulate this. It only wanted to bring this type of arbitration to the attention of the 
parties and clarify that the terms of the contract cannot be affected even by arbitrators 
given such powers. See on this United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration at p. 112. 
85 Civil Code, supra note 9, Article 1763. In the Civil Code of Ethiopia equity plays a role in 
determining the content of contracts. Article 1713 provides that parties to a contract are 
‘bound by the contract and such incidental effects as are attached to the obligations 
concerned by custom, equity, and good faith having regard to the nature of the contract.’’ 
According to Article 1766 of the Civil Code the court may vary a contract where a special 
relationship such as family relationship exists between the parties and such relationship 
compels them to deal with each other in accordance with equity. 
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as amiable compositeurs they may have even more powers and hence revise the 
contract subject to limitations imposed by public policy.  
However, we must admit that there is no much legal authority on this point in 
Ethiopia. Only one Cassation Bench decision lends support to such expansive 
powers of arbitrators though it does not expressly deal with amiable 
composition.86 The dispute involved three members of an extended family who 
were engaged in business together. They could not continue as business partners 
because of serious disagreement. Hence, they entrusted settlement of their 
dispute regarding the winding up of their business to Sergan Jama family 
council (elders from their community).87 The agreement does not characterise 
itself as an arbitration agreement, but they undertook to be bound by the 
decision of these elders. In fact, the agreement indicates that it was the elders 
who took the initiative and offered to intervene to ‘reconcile’ the business 
partners. The latter only accepted efforts at ‘reconciliation’ and undertook to be 
bound by the decision of the Sergan Jama, i.e., family council.88  
On 18 November 1997 (08 Hidar 1990 E.C), fifteen days after the signing of 
the agreement, the Sergan Jama elders made known their findings reached after 
conducting inquiry and ‘convincing’ the parties to the dispute. After partial 
compliance with the decision of the elders Mr. Miftah Kedir discontinued 
effecting payments. Hence, Mr. Mukemil Mohammed applied to the Federal 
First Instance Court for the execution of the decision of the elders.89  
Mr. Miftah Kedir contended that there was no agreement to arbitrate, and 
therefore, the findings of the elders do not amount to an arbitral award. He 
argued that there was no award that could be ‘executed’ by a court. The Federal 
First Instance Court heard the testimony of the persons involved in ‘resolving’ 
the dispute. It found that they were engaged in reconciling and convincing the 
parties, and concluded that the elders were not acting as arbitrators. The First 
                                           
86 Mukemil Mohammed v. Miftah Kedir, Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia, Cassation File 
Number 38794, decision of 31 March 2009 (24 Megabit 2001 EC) Reported in Cassation 
Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, Vol. 9, pp 173-175. 
87 Agreement between Miftah Kedir, Mukemil Mohammed and a third partner also signed 
by seven traditional elders dated 3 November 1997 (23 Tikimt 1990 E.C). The file was 
obtained from the attorney of one of the parties and a copy is retained. 
88 Ibid. The agreement contains a penalty clause. It stipulates the person who fails to abide 
by the decision of the Sergan Jema family council will have to pay by way of penalty 
50,000 Birr to the State, 40,000 Birr to the other party and 10,000 Birr to the Sergan Jema 
elders. The agreement was signed by the three people in dispute and seven Sergan Jema 
elders. 
89 Application for execution of ‘arbitral award’ lodged by Mr. Mukemil Mohammed dated 
12 December 2001(03 Tahsas 1994 EC). The outstanding amount for which execution 
was lodged was Birr 170,122.75(One hundred seventy thousand one hundred twenty two 
and seventy five cents). 
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Instance Court decided that the exercise was ‘conciliation’ rather than 
arbitration,90 and thus held that there was no award to execute.  According to the 
First Instance Court, the parties are not bound by the findings of the conciliators 
unless they ‘expressly agree in writing to confirm them’ per the requirement of 
the Civil Code.91  In the case at hand, there was no written agreement between 
the parties confirming acceptance of the terms of the compromise drawn by the 
conciliators, the First Instance Court noted.92 Mr. Mukemil Mohammed 
appealed to the Federal High Court.  The High Court confirmed the decision of 
the First Instance Court.93  
Aggrieved by this decision of the two courts, Mr. Mukemil Mohammed 
sought review on cassation for ‘basic error of law’. For the Cassation Bench, the 
fact that the parties to the dispute had agreed to be bound by the decision of the 
elders was sufficient to characterize the exercise as arbitration. The Cassation 
Bench stated that the agreement between the parties indicates that ‘the tribunal’ 
was established to ‘reconcile the misunderstanding’ concerning property and 
money between the named parties and that the said parties ‘undertook to accept 
findings and decisions’ of the tribunal.94 According to the Cassation Bench, this 
agreement shows that the parties have vested in the shimagles power to pass 
decisions and have ‘agreed to accept the decisions’ passed by them. Thus, the 
Cassation Bench ordered that the ‘award’ be executed by reversing the decision 
of the lower courts that had considered the exercise as conciliation rather than 
arbitration.95  
The Cassation Bench of the Federal Supreme Court considered the Sergan 
Jama council as an arbitral tribunal although the council aimed at ‘reconciling’ 
the misunderstanding between the relatives. This is because the parties to the 
dispute had ‘undertaken to accept the findings and decisions’ of the Council. 
The Cassation Bench disregarded the testimony given before the First Instance 
Court by the elders themselves (as regards how they proceeded) from which the 
First Instance Court had concluded that the exercise was conciliation rather than 
arbitration. The Cassation Bench did not inquire into the substantive basis of the 
                                           
90 Mukemil Mohammed v. Miftah Kedir, Federal First Instance Court, Case No. 00136, 
decision rendered on 26 September 2007. 
91 Civil Code of Ethiopia, supra note 9, Article 3322(2) provides ‘[t]he parties shall not be 
bound by the terms of the compromise drawn up by the conciliator unless they have 
expressly undertaken in writing to confirm them.’ 
92 Mukemil Mohammed v. Miftah Kedir, supra note 90. 
93 Mukemil Mohammed v. Miftah Kedir, Federal High Court, Case No. 60530, decision 
dated 17 April 2008 (Miazia 9, 2000 EC). 
94 Mukemil Mohammed v. Miftah Kedir, Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench, supra 
note 86. My own free translation of the Cassation Court decision reported in Cassation 
Court Decisions Volume 9, pp 173 to 175. 
95 Ibid.  
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decision of the elders. As traditional elders, what they did was render a decision 
that they deemed fair in view of, among other things, the blood relationship 
between the parties to the dispute, and the need to close the chapter and move 
forward as relatives.96 Yet, the Cassation Bench accepted their decision as an 
arbitral award. An arbitration agreement need not necessarily designate itself as 
such97 if there is the express intention that involves arbitration. 
Leaving aside whether the Cassation Bench got the facts of the case and the 
intention of the parties right in this particular case, the undertaking to be bound 
by the outcome of the decision of a third party is the critical factor. If we go by 
this decision, there is no need to even consider the normative basis of the 
decision by the third party. In contrast to its finding in Mukemil Mohammed v. 
Miftah Kedir, the Cassation Bench (in a later case) emphasises the duty of 
arbitrators to stick to the agreement of the parties and the arguments raised by 
the parties before the tribunal in deciding matters before them.98 In Ethio-
Telecom v. PTE International Incorporated, the latter had undertaken to carry 
out various tasks aimed at improving the performance of the personnel of Ethio-
Telecom. As per the contract, Ethio-Telecom was required to pay US$ 4 million 
in three instalments. 12% of each instalment was to be withheld as guarantee for 
performance of the contract. The amount so withheld was to be released to PTE 
International within 15 days from completion of the project, if implementation 
of the project was found to be satisfactory.99  
PTE International could not complete the tasks envisaged by the contract. 
The evaluation carried out by Ethio-Telecom revealed that only 71% of the tasks 
                                           
96 Telephone interview, with Mr. Miftah Kedir, conducted on   21 February 2015.  
Unfortunately, I could not get the views of Mr. Mukemil Mohammed, who reportedly, 
has passed away. 
97 Bruce Haris et al (2007), The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary, 4th ed., Blackwell 
Publishing Inc.,  p. 52 In David Wilson Homes Ltd v. Survey Services Limited, a clause 
in an insurance policy that read as ‘any dispute or difference arising hereunder . . . shall 
be referred to a Queen’s Counsel of the English Bar to be mutually agreed …  or in the 
event of disagreement by the Chairman of the Bar Council’’ was deemed to constitute an 
arbitration agreement despite no mention of arbitration at all in the clause. That the 
dispute was referred to a third party that would render a binding decision and that the 
matter related to an insurance policy rendered any construction of this clause to mean 
something different from arbitration lead to this conclusion.  
98 Ethio-Telecom v. PTE International Incorporated, Cassation Case No. 63063, Cassation 
Bench of the Federal Supreme Court, decision of 13 November 2012(03 Hidar 2005). 
Reported in Cassation Bench Decisions Vol. 14. The central issues the Cassation Bench 
addressed are whether review on Cassation is possible despite a finality clause in the 
arbitration agreement and the substantive issue of whether the facts of the case indicate 
there was novation of contract. So, the case is not really authority on the issue of amiable 
composition. It is only an obiter dictum. 
99 Ibid.             
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agreed were successfully carried out. PTE International did not contest this 
finding.100 Yet, Ethio-Telecom did not seek performance of the balance of the 
contract. PTE International demanded that Ethio-Telecom release, from the 
amount withheld by the latter as guarantee of good performance, a sum that 
represents work successfully completed (i.e. 71% of the amount withheld).101    
The Arbitral Tribunal, formed based on the arbitration clause, granted the 
claim of PTE International on the ground that the internal review undertaken by 
Ethio-Telecom amounts to novation, a new contract. It reasoned that the 
payment of a percentage of the amount withheld as guarantee can be implied 
from that.102 The Cassation Bench did not find this tenable. It disagreed on 
grounds of form requirements for modification of contract. It remarked that ‘an 
arbitral tribunal should decide based on valid undertakings agreed upon by 
contracting parties.’103 The Cassation Bench was not addressing the issue of 
amiable composition; in this particular case its emphasis on the importance of 
arbitrators sticking to the terms of contract does not augur well for the notion.  
In this case, the Cassation Bench sounds predisposed to reject modification of 
contract by arbitrators, even where the latter are given mandate to settle.  
Ethio-Telecom v. PTE International does not really imply rejection of 
amiable composition. The Cassation Bench only made a remark about a doctrine 
that was not dispositive in the particular case without even mentioning it by 
name.  Mukemil Mohammed v. Miftah Kedir appears to be a more pertinent 
authority. Hence, we may conclude that an arbitral tribunal may revise the 
contract between the parties to a dispute, at least so long as the parties have 
authorised it to do so, and if the parties have undertaken to be bound by the 
resultant decision.  
Conclusions 
Ethiopian law is flexible as regards norms applicable to the substance of a 
dispute in arbitration. The law defines arbitration as settlement of dispute by 
reference to principles of law, a notion that is much wider than law or even rules 
of law. So, unlike some other jurisdictions,104 arbitration agreement in Ethiopia 
                                           
100 Ibid.        
101 Ibid.        
102 Ibid.      
103 Ibid. Incidentally, the Cassation Bench underscored that arbitral tribunals should also 
decide based on arguments raised in the proceedings implying arbitral proceedings are 
adversarial.  
104 Blaszczac and Kolber, supra note 18, pp. 191-192. In Poland, for example, express 
authorization by the parties is required for the tribunal to apply principles of law. In 
contrast, the Swiss and French laws as well as legal doctrine developed in the two 
countries provide that the basis of decision should be ‘règles du droit’, thus implicitly 
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need not even authorize the application of principles of law to the merits of the 
dispute. This shows that Ethiopian law is more liberal than many arbitration 
friendly laws such as the UNCITRAL Model Law,105 when it comes to party 
autonomy to determine norms applicable to the substance of a dispute.106  
Moreover, the law does not prohibit parties to arbitration from choosing 
foreign law and even rules of law that apply to the substance of their dispute. 
Given this absence of prohibition, we may hold that parties are at liberty to 
choose foreign law and rules of law. Likewise, parties may authorise arbitrators 
to apply equity both in the weaker and stronger interpretations. Somehow less 
settled, however, is the issue of whether parties to arbitration can vest in the 
tribunal mandate to settle –i.e., conferring on it power to re-write some 
contractual obligations of parties, to re-establish the balance of interest at stake 
short of violating public policy.  Even this mandate can be regarded as a 
possibility in view of what the decision of the Cassation Bench in Mukemil 
Mohammed v. Miftah Kedir suggests.                                                                    ■ 
                                                                                                            
allowing the use of general principles of law as the basis for decision, so long as at least 
the general principles are part of the legal system.  See also, Hosseraye et al, supra note 
13, at p. 352. The 2011 French Law leaves to the parties the choice of law applicable to 
the substance of the dispute but, where the parties have not made choice, the arbitrators 
are free to apply the ‘rules of law’ That they consider appropriate. In other words, the 
arbitrators do not need an express authorization by parties to apply ‘rules of law’ instead 
of limiting themselves to the law of a specific country. The use of the words ‘rules of 
law’ instead of ‘law’ is deliberate. They aim at enabling the arbitrators to apply 
principles of law rather than being bound to the laws of a specific country.   
105  UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, Articles 28(1) and (2) of the Model Law indicate 
disputes are to be resolved based on ‘rules of law’ chosen by the parties to the arbitration 
agreement. In case parties to arbitration agreement fail to choose the applicable law, 
arbitrators are to apply ‘the law’ determined by the conflict of laws rules they consider 
are applicable. So, where parties have not chosen ‘rules of law’, what will apply is a 
specific law reached through the application of conflict of laws rules. So where the ‘law’ 
of the specific state reached at by application of conflict of laws rules does not mandate 
the application ‘principles of law’, only the laws of the specific state will apply to the 
substance of the dispute.  
106 Section 1051(1) of the German law provides that arbitrators are to decide disputes in 
accordance with such ‘rules of law’ as are chosen by the parties. ‘Rules of law’ are 
generally construed to be broader than the ‘law’ as seen in relation to French Law. So, 
the use of this term suggests parties can, according to German law, validly choose the 
application of principles of law. But providing for cases where parties to dispute have not 
chosen substantive law applicable to the dispute, sub 2 of Section 1051 says ‘the law of 
the state’, with which the subject matter of the proceeding is most closely related applies. 
Here the change in language indicates use of ‘principles of law’ is not the default option 
unlike in Ethiopia. See German Arbitration Law of 1998, tenth Book of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, available in English at: <http://www.dis-arb.de/en/51/materials/german-
arbitration-law-98-id3>, accessed on 13/09/2011.  
